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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 06/04/2006

Accident number: 296

Accident time: 08:25

Accident Date: 15/02/2000

Where it occurred: Ploughshare minefield,
Mozambique border
Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Zimbabwe
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Vegetation removal
accident

Date of main report: 21/02/2000

ID original source: JM

Name of source: Mounser/AVS
2001:Z01

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast

Ground condition: woodland (bush)

Date record created: 19/02/2004

Date last modified: 19/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate training (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate investigation (?)

Accident report
A limited accident report was made available by the programme manager in January 2001.
The report provided was not an original document. Documents of any kind were only provided
by this demining group in 2001 after pressure had been applied through the funder. To try to
counter any omissions in the reports provided, statements were also taken from a field
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supervisor and the doctor who treated the victims in March 2001. The following summarises
the content of the documents provided and includes detail added by the other sources.
At the time of this accident the demining company operated in one-man teams using a oneman drill [from the start of 2000 this drill was adopted]. In this a single deminer looks for
tripwires, cuts undergrowth, uses the detector and excavates finds. The group issued frontal
protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while excavating.
The victim was part of a “Survey Team” which was investigating the boundaries of a
reinforcement (a belt of additional mines laid at random between the maintenance road and
the first “A” row of mapped mines). The reinforcement had been “reported by local
inhabitants”. Following the patterns expected in the ploughshare minefield, the strip of ground
being surveyed was not expected to be mined. It was later found that the reinforced area
extended further than the site of the accident.
Wearing his visor and armour apron, the victim swept the ground with his detector and
noticed no signal. He then got up to cut vegetation and, at 0825 hours, detonated an R2M2
mine by stepping on it. “He sustained traumatic high velocity blast amputation of the right foot
with sparing of the ipsilateral ankle joint. He also sustained first degree burns to the right
arm”. The site supervisor corrected this to “part of” his right foot being amputated.
The victim was evacuated from the accident site by a medic immediately and was attended by
the Site Doctor within five minutes. He was transported in the “backup ambulance” (a
Landrover) to Karanda Mission Hospital. “At the hospital, successful surgery was conducted
with the right foot being amputated at ankle height”. Two days later “the Doctor noticed an
unexpected drop in oxygen saturation and the patient died later that night. From an X-ray
picture taken that evening, the surgeon concluded that the cause of death was Aspiration
Pneumonia”.
“A subsequent accident investigation showed that the centre of the blast was on the edge of
the clearing lane. The depth of the crater suggested that the mine was buried at least 16
centimetres deep and not easily detectable by the detectors in common use [Vallon]. That the
mine was located on the edge of the lane and that it was buried so deep might have
contributed to it being missed.”
The victim was visited in hospital on the day following the accident and was sitting up in bed
making jokes.

Victim Report
Victim number: 376

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 2 hours 5 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Arm
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
FATAL
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COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
A brief medical report made out by the site doctor was obtained. This stated that the victim
suffered “traumatic amputation of his right foot”.
Field treatment involved:
“Pressure bandaging R foot
Fluid replacement with Ringers Lactate solution IV
Bentyl [sp?] penicillin antibiotic 1 [illegible] 5ml
ATT 0.5 ml 1ml, Pethizine [Sp?] 100mg 1 ml”
The victim was evacuated to Karanda hospital leaving at 09:00 and arriving at 10:30. He was
in the operating theatre from 11:00 – 14:00. The surgical procedure was a “definitive surgical
amputation of right foot”.
On “Day Two post-operative” the victim was “stable, ambulatory”.
An addendum notes: “Patient in acute respiratory distress on Thurs 17/02/2000, demising on
same day around 22:00 hrs”.
From an X-ray picture taken that evening, the surgeon concluded that the cause of death was
“Aspiration Pneumonia”.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management Control inadequacy” because
the preliminary survey of local people indicated that the area was mined. The Survey team
then went mine-hunting without using clearance drills or marking systems. This was an
inappropriate method of “reducing” the suspect area by “Survey” and implies inadequate
training and preparation. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.
The accident investigation is considered inadequate because it was edited prior to being
made available. And because only a limited summary was made available.
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